


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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET

February 5, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VERIFICATION PANEL WORKING GROUP

SUBJECT: SALT - NAC Consultation on FBS

In light of comments on the January 31 draft telegram on this subject the attached revision has been prepared. It incorporates the substance, and most of the specific formulations, suggested by agencies in commenting on the earlier draft.

It will be necessary to dispatch the telegram today so that USNATO can use it as a basis for discussion of this subject at the Perm Reps luncheon February 6. Therefore, comments should be received no later than 5:00 p.m. this afternoon. If comments are not received by that time it will be assumed that the telegram is cleared and it will be dispatched showing the usual agency clearances.

Robert A. Martin
PM/DCA

Attachment:

Draft Telegram

cc: NSC - Mr. Odeen
JCS - Col. Von Ins
CIA -
OSD - Dr. Tucker
ACDA - Mr. Keeny

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Draft Telegram to USNATO

SUBJECT: NAC Discussion of FBS in SALT TWO

REFERENCE: USNATO 440 and 444

1. We are prepared to participate in further NAC consideration and discussion of FBS problem in SALT. Our posture will be one essentially of listening to Allies' views.
2. You should stress that US has not repeat not decided how best to deal with the FBS question when SALT resumes, but we are examining these matters in framework of general SALT negotiating situation and possible approaches. We recognize direct interest of our Allies in FBS problem and Allied views will be an important element in our studies. When, with benefit of this discussion, we adopt a concrete negotiating approach to next SALT session, including FBS, we will bring this before the Council.
3. USREP should refer to US SALT reports of last November and December as descriptions of how FBS topic has developed in SALT and position Soviets have taken. You should reemphasize that our fundamental objective

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in SALT TWO remains to deal in a satisfactory way with central strategic systems (SLBMs, ICBMs, and heavy bombers) and to replace interim freeze with agreement which provides for essential equivalence in these systems, preferably through reductions.

4. FYI. We do not wish at this time to point to any particular way of dealing with FBS problem, on which either NAC or we will be frozen. Formal NAC or NATO military study of FBS alternatives should for this reason be discouraged. NAC endorsement of trying out a general non-circumvention formula some time in resumed negotiations would not raise problems, provided timing and tactics of exploring such an approach with the Soviets are left to US discretion, and provided NAC discussion did not develop in such a way that we could not, should it appear necessary or desirable, come back to NAC with another approach should non-circumvention formula not be productive in helping us achieve our SALT negotiating objectives.







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5 February 1973

SUBJECT: SALT - NAC Consultation on FBS

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